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Abstract—We present a social simulation model that covers
three main financial services: Banks, Retail Stores, and Payments
systems. Our aim is to address the problem of a lack of public
data sets for fraud detection research in each of these domains,
and provide a variety of fraud scenarios such as money laun-
dering, sales fraud (based on refunds and discounts), and credit
card fraud. Currently, there is a general lack of public research
concerning fraud detection in the financial domains in general
and these three in particular. One reason for this is the secrecy
and sensitivity of the customers data that is needed to perform
research. We present PaySim, RetSim, and BankSim as three
case studies of social simulations for financial transactions using
agent-based modelling. These simulators enable us to generate
synthetic transaction data of normal behaviour of customers,
and also known fraudulent behaviour. This synthetic data can
be used to further advance fraud detection research, without
leaking sensitive information about the underlying data. Using
statistics and social network analysis (SNA) on real data we can
calibrate the relations between staff and customers, and generate
realistic synthetic data sets. The generated data represents real
world scenarios that are found in the original data with the added
benefit that this data can be shared with other researchers for
testing similar detection methods without concerns for privacy
and other restrictions present when using the original data.
I. INTRODUCTION
Modelling the social financial behaviour of individuals is
not a simple task. The social behaviour of individuals include
many complex transactions. These interactions are driven by
many factors and are constrained by the context surrounding
them. In this paper we cover an important topic concerning
the human financial interactions in the financial transactions
domain. Unfortunately, whenever money is involved, there is
been a risk of fraud.
Fraud is an important problem in a number of different
situations. The economic impact can be substantial. The detec-
tion of fraud is therefore a worthwhile endeavour. However, in
order to investigate, develop, test and improve fraud detection
techniques there is a need for detailed information about the
domain and its peculiarities.
All these needs can be satisfied if we had access to publicly
available data of financial transactions so that different ap-
proaches could be compared and contrasted. Unfortunately for
several reasons, including confidentiality, protection of privacy,
the law, internal policies and regulations, it is hard if not
impossible for an outside researcher to get access to such a
data. Hence, research has historically been hampered by a lack
of publicly available relevant data sets. Our aim with this work
is to address that situation.
This paper is an effort to deal with the lack of public avail-
able financial data, with the idea that if we can not get access to
public financial records due the restrictions mentioned before,
then one good alternative is to use a simulator to generate
financial data. However simulating a financial environment
and generating data brings new challenges, specifically those
related to characteristics of the generated data such as quality,
privacy, realistic and usefulness.
We present three different case studies in the area of the
social simulation of financial transactions for fraud detection
research. The first consists of a new payment system that uses
mobile phones to ease the payments, called PaySim [1]. Our
access to base level data was poor at the time of that research
being performed. Thus, we experienced difficulties to build
an accurate model. This lead our research to our second case
study called RetSim [2]. RetSim is a simulation tool that gener-
ates realistic scenarios of a retail store based on transactional
data from one of the biggest shoe retailers in Scandinavia. The
last case study is called BankSim, which is our first approach
towards the simulation of bank transactions; payments and
transfers between different people and merchants. BankSim is
based on the public available aggregated transactions shared
by a bank in Spain, with the main objective of promoting
applications for Big Data uses of their services.
The main goal of developing these simulators is that it
enables us to produce and share realistic fraud data with the
research community, without exposing potentially sensitive
and private information about the actual source.
Simulation also have other benefits: it can produce more
data much faster and with less cost than for instance, collecting
data, and one can try different scenarios of fraud, detection
algorithms, and personnel and security policy approaches,
in an actual store, for example, the introduction of new
supervisors, security cameras, auditing routines, etc. The latter
also risks incurring e.g. unhappiness among the staff, due to
trying e.g. an ill advised policy, which leads to even greater
expense and problems.
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The main contribution of our approach is a method to
generate anonymous synthetic data of a “typical” financial
chain, that can then be used as part of the necessary input
data for the research, development and testing of fraud detec-
tion techniques, both research prototypes and commercially
available systems. Also, the data set generated could be the
basis for research in other fields, such as marketing, demand
prediction, logistics and demand/supply research.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: Section II
presents related work on simulation and fraud detection for
the financial domain. Section III describes the methodology
used for our research. Section IV presents PaySim. Section V
presents RetSim. Section VI presents BankSim. We present
a description of the model, evaluation and results for the
simulators and finish with a discussion in section VII and
conclusions, including future work in section VIII.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Simulations in financial domains have traditionally been
built to predict markets changes, stocks prices and more
specifically in the domain of retail stores for finding an-
swers to logistics problems such as inventory management,
supply management, staff scheduling and for customer queue
reductions [3]. Our work uses similar techniques of financial
modelling but has a different focus, which is the generation
of synthetic data sets for fraud detection research.
Some of the benefits of using a synthetic data set for testing
machine learning algorithms have been previously addressed
by us [4]. We argue that: data that represent realistic scenarios
can be made readily available; the privacy of the customer is
not impacted; disclosure of results is not affected by policies
or legal issues; the generated data set can be made available
for other researchers to reproduce experiments; and different
scenarios can be modelled by changing the parameters con-
trolled by the researcher.
There has been work in the area of privacy preserving
methods for data mining [5]. However, since the main problem
in our experience usually is to get access to the data in the
first place, our approach is to try and generate data that can
then be shared without problems from a privacy perspective.
The actual analysis method then does not need to be privacy
preserving.
Social Network Analysis is a topic that is currently being
combined with Social Simulation [6]. Both topics support each
other in the representation of interactions and behaviour of
agents in the specific context of social networks. However,
there is no work in the field of customer/salesman interaction
that we are aware of.
Money laundering threatens the economic and social devel-
opment of countries. Due to the high amount of transactions
and the variety of money laundering tricks and techniques,
it is difficult for the authorities to detect money laundering
and prosecute the wrongdoers. Thus, it is not only the ever
increasing amount of transactions, but the ever changing
characteristics of the methods used to launder money that are
constantly being modified by the fraudsters which makes this
problem interesting to study.
In Sweden and other countries, most companies in the finan-
cial sector are required by law to implement money laundering
detection. The cost of implementing such controls for AML
is quite high, mainly because of the amount of manual labour
required. In Sweden alone the cost is estimated to be around
400 million SEK annually [7]. The most recent notorious case
of money laundering is the HSBC Bank case [8], where the
lack of AML controls lead to large amounts of money being
laundered and injected into the U.S. financial system from
countries under strict control, such as Mexico and Iran.
The most common method today used for preventing illegal
financial transactions consists on flagging different clients
according to perceived risk and restricting their transactions
using thresholds [9]. Transactions that exceed these thresholds
require extra scrutiny whereby the client needs to declare
the precedence of the funds. These thresholds are usually set
by law without distinction made between different economic
sectors or actors. This of course leads to fraudsters adapting
their behaviour in order to avoid this kind of controls, by
e.g. making many smaller transactions that fall just below the
threshold. Hence, these and other similar methods have proven
insufficient [7].
New promising research in the field of data mining based
methods have also been used to detect fraud [10]. This
leads to the observation that machine learning algorithms can
identify novel methods of fraud by detecting those transactions
that are different (anomalous) in comparison to the benign
transactions. Supervised learning algorithms have been used
on synthetic data to prove the performance of outliers detection
in different domains [11].
Several machine learning techniques have been used for
the detection of fraud, and more specifically money launder-
ing [12]. The application of machine learning to the problem
is advantageous in many situations [13], [14]. However, to
our knowledge, there are not a sufficient number of studies on
this topic with public financial data to determine whether one
detection method is better than another. Our simulators aim to
close this gap and allow these researchers and organisations
interested in fraud detection research to test, compare and
develop new methods.
III. METHODOLOGY
We developed three different case studies on financial
transactions. The first consists of a payment system that
uses mobile phones to easy the payments PaySim, introduced
in [1]. The second is RetSim, a simulation tool that generates
realistic scenarios based on transactional data from one of
the biggest shoe retail stores in Scandinavia. [2], [15]. The
last, is BankSim, a simulator built on a sample of aggregated
transactional data that one Spanish bank made available for
a contest to encourage the development of applications in the
big data field and specifically based on their data set. All
simulators use the same Multi-Agent Based Simulation toolkit,
called MASON, which is implemented in Java [16].
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PaySim was based only on the schema of the database and
the described behaviour of the customers for the simulated
system. At the time of development, the system was in a
testing phase, which made it impossible for us to obtain
realistic data to calibrate the behaviour of the agents. However,
we used the generated data to illustrate the possibilities and
usefulness of the model by first generating a synthetic data set
and second by performing an example of fraud detection using
labelled data and machine learning techniques to classify the
injected malicious behaviour.
PaySim is still waiting for real data from our partner in
order to move forward with the calibration of the simulation
and experimentation on diverse fraud scenarios. This situation
made us focus our attention on our second case study RetSim.
RetSim started with the contribution of real data from a new
partner, one of the largest Nordic shoe retailers. This data
contains several hundred million records of diverse transac-
tional data from all their stores from a few years ago, and also
covering several years. This data is recent enough to reflect
current conditions, but old enough to not pose a serious risk
from a competitor analysis standpoint.
To better understand the problem domain, specifically the
normal operation of a store (which is the domain from where
we have access to data), we began by performing a data
analysis of the historical data provided by the retailer. We
were interested in finding necessary and sufficient attributes
to enable us to simulate a realistic scenario in which we
could reason about and detect interesting cases of fraud. This
information was useful to build a social network interaction
between customers and salesmen.
Fraud analysis has traditionally been strongly associated
with network analysis. This is because of the possibility of sev-
eral actors participating in a specific fraud in order to confuse
the investigators and dilute the evidence, hence describing a
network of actors, companies, ownership etc. By doing this we
aim to model the micro behaviour of the different agents that
captures the observed macro behaviour and gives rise to a total
picture of the store. We generated a social network from the
relation between customers and salesmen. We measured and
use its properties to simulate a similar network with the aim
of preserving interesting properties from the original social
network such as topology, average in-degree and out-degree
distribution of the salesmen and customers that are relevant to
fraud detection.
We have no known instances of fraud in the real data (as
certified by the data owner). So we had to inject malicious
behaviour, by programming agents that behave according
to some known or hypothesised retail fraud case presented
before: Refunds and Discounts.
IV. PAYSIM, A MOBILE MONEY PAYMENT SIMULATOR
Mobile Money Payment Simulation case study is based on
a real company that has developed a mobile money imple-
mentation that provides mobile phone users with the ability
to transfer money between themselves using the phone as a
sort of electronic wallet. The task at hand is to develop an
approach that detects suspicious activities that are indicative
of money laundering.
Unfortunately, this service has only been running in a demo
phase. This situation prevent us to collect any data that can
be used for analysis of possible detection methods of illegal
money transfers.
We modelled and implemented a Multi-Agent Based Sim-
ulator that uses the schema of the real mobile money service,
but can generate synthetic data based on unknown scenarios
that we based on our guess of what could be possible when
the real system starts operating.
The simulation contains one agent that represent the clients
of the service. The agents are represented by the class Client
which extends to two child classes (ClientSimA and Fraud-
ster). The inherit model allows an agent to rewrite specific
behaviour of a client but implement its own specific behaviour.
We created different types of agents and instantiate them
together in the class Clients to represent the normal behaviour
of clients and fraudsters.
Each clients has four possible actions in each step of the
simulation. They can either make a deposit, a withdrawal, a
transfer or simply “decide” not to do anything. The autonomy
of the agent is implemented by a probabilistic transition
function that computes the type of operation and the action
that an agent will perform in each step. This transition function
depends on the attributes of the client such as Age and the
amount is calculated according to the balance and the limits
previously defined for each client profile. To reflect what
a realistic scenario could look like, we used the thresholds
imposed by the original money laundering system.
For each simulation we can modify the parameters and
the probabilities of occurrence for the transitions in order to
improve the quality of the simulation. It is difficult to find
the right probabilities that model a realistic scenario. Our
implementation is based on pseudo random transitions. The
given probabilities are based on 3 different configurations
for the percentage of account balance in comparison to the
maximum limit allowed by the client profile (Lower than 15%,
higher than 80% and medium balance which is between low
and high). The agent has a higher probability of making a
deposit when the balance is low. When the balance is high the
agent has a higher probability of making a withdrawal or a
transfer, rather than a deposit.
A. Description of Scenarios
Our chosen scenario is an hypothetical situation where 200
clients from 4 different cities perform several transactions with
partners inside or outside their city. We decided to have around
10% of the clients behaving as malicious agents (fraudsters).
In a real scenario it is more common to find a lower percentage
of fraudsters. The idea behind a higher proportion of fraudsters
is to prevent the class imbalance problem during the training
of the detector. All of the fraudsters were connected in a
network where the 3 roles of the money laundering chain were
represented (injection, layering and integration).
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The social network between the clients was built restricting
the network to a maximum of five contacts per client inside the
city, and two outside the city. The fraudsters can also interact
with normal clients of the system.
All the transactions are stored in a log file. The simulation
was run five times for 1000 steps. Each step represents a
time unit that we assume is the transaction rate of the clients
(1/3 per day). The files generated were merged and ultimately
used as input for the machine learning algorithms presented
in sect. IV-B.
B. Results
In total we simulated 486977 transactions over 5 simula-
tions, each one with 200 agents performing 1000 steps. A total
of 6006 transactions were generated by 107 malicious agents
and labelled as suspicious. Each of the malicious agents was
designed with a specific goal in mind, chosen from the money
laundering cycle that involves the three stages: placement (40),
layering (33), and integration (34). The data generated by the
simulation represent a realistic situation of the class imbalance
problem, where one of the classes is very large in comparison
to the other one. In this case only 1.23% of the total data
is suspicious. For the experiment we ran different supervised
algorithms that were selected for the purpose of classifying
the class labelled as suspicious transactions.
The results can be seen in Table I and II. We can see that
JRip produces the best accuracy in TP (True Positive) rate
and FP (False Positives) rate in comparison with the other
algorithms. The MC (Misclassified) number of instances is
a bit higher than for the other algorithms e.g J48graft or
Random-Forest.
TABLE I
RESULTS FOR THE CLASS money laundering (SUSPICIOUS)
Algorithm TP FP MC
Naive-Bayes 0.988 0.479 8543
Decision-Table 0.999 0.029 200
Jrip 0.999 0.012 115
Random-Forest 0.999 0.009 66
Random-Tree 0.999 0.015 173
J48graft 0.999 0.014 118
TABLE II
CONFUSION MATRIX
Algorithm JRip Random-Forest J48graft
class* a b a b a b
a 5934 72 5954 52 5922 84
b 43 480928 14 480957 34 480937
* a=Normal b=Suspicious
C. Evaluation of the model
We start the evaluation of our model with the verification
and validation of the generated simulation data [17]. The
verification ensures that the simulation correspond to the
described model presented in the chosen scenarios. We can
easily check the constraints in the generated data such as
positive balance numbers, account age, consistency between
the transfers, deposits and withdrawals with the changes in
account balances. Validation of the model is a bit more
complex, since we need to ascertain whether the model is an
accurate representation of a real world situation. Since we do
not have real world data at this time, we need to rely on a
description of the desired scenario and the opinion of experts
in the field to validate that the basic statistics and the overall
process of the simulation design correspond to a real world
scenario. The complexity of the agents also matter here, the
simpler the agents the easier is to validate the model.
Calibrating the model to a realistic scenario was rather hard
in this simulation. From this difficulty we learnt a lot about
the importance of accessing and sharing real data for fraud
detection. Hopefully soon we will be able to get our hands
on real data from this system that will help to improve the
accuracy of the simulator.
V. RETSIM, A RETAIL STORE SIMULATOR
Since we have access to several years worth of transaction
data from one of the largest Scandinavian retail shoe chains,
we developed RetSim, a Retail shoe store Simulation, built
on the concept of Multi Agent Based Simulation (MABS).
RetSim is intended to be used for developing and investigating
fraud scenarios at a shoe retail store, while keeping business
sensitive and private personal information about customers
consumption secret from competitors and others.
The defence against fraud is an important topic that has seen
some study. In the retail store the cost of fraud are of course
ultimately transferred to the consumer, and finally impacts
the overall economy. Our aim with the research leading to
RetSim is to learn the relevant parameters that governs the
behaviour in and of a retail store to simulate normal behaviour,
which is our focus in this paper. However we also touch
upon the simulation of malicious behaviour and detection.
As fraud in the retail setting is usually perpetrated by the
staff we have focused on that. Examples of such fraud is e.g:
Sales cancellations The salesman cancels the purchase of some
items on the receipt and doesn’t tell the customer, pocketing
the difference. Refunds The salesman creates fraudulent refund
slips and keeps the cash refund. Coupon reductions/discounts
The salesman registers a discount on the sale and doesn’t tell
the customer, pocketing the difference. In many of these cases
the fraud is simplified if the customer is an accomplice.
A. Model
The design of RetSim was based on the ODD model
introduced by Grimm et.al. [18]. ODD contains 3 main parts:
Overview, Design Concepts and Details.
We aim to produce a simulation that resembles a real retail
store. Our main purpose is to generate a synthetic data set of
business transactions that can be used for the development and
testing of different fraud detection techniques. It is important
due to the difficulty of finding a sufficient amount of diverse
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cases of fraud in a real data set. However this is not the
case in a simulated environment, where fraud can be injected
following known patterns of fraud.
There are three agents in this simulation: Manager, Sales
clerk and Customer.
Manager This agent decides the price, check inven-
tory and order new items.
Sales clerk Is in charge of promoting the items and
issues the receipt after each sale. A sales clerk can be
in state busy when the clerk is serving its maximum
amount of customers.
Customer The behaviour is determined by the goal
of purchasing one or several items. A customer is
in an active need-help state, when no sales clerk is
assisting the customer with its shopping.
1) Process overview and scheduling: During a normal step
of the simulation, a customer enters the simulation, and a sales
clerk sense nearby customers in the need-help state and offers
help. There are two different outcomes: Either a transaction
takes place, with probability p, or no transaction takes place
with, trivially, probability 1− p.
The time granularity of the simulation is each step repre-
senting a day of sales. So a normal week has seven steps
and a month will consist of around 30 steps. We do not
make any explicit distinction between specific days of the
week. Instead we handle differences between days by using a
different distribution of the customers per day.
2) Design Concepts: The basic principle of this model is
the concept of a commercial transactions. We can observe
an emergent social network from the relation between the
customers and the sales clerks. Each of the customers have
the objective of purchasing articles from the store. The sales
clerks objective is to aid the customers and produce the receipt
necessary for the generation of the data set. Managers play a
special role in the simulation. They serve as the schedulers
for the next step of the simulation. Given the specific step of
the simulation the manager generate a supply of customers for
the next day and activate or deactivate specific sales clerks in
the store. In our virtual environment the interaction between
agents is always between sales clerk and customer. Purchase
articles from another customer or selling articles to a sales
clerk is not permitted.
Customers and sales clerks can scout the store in any radial
direction from their current position and search or offer help,
respectively.
The agents do not perform any specific learning activities.
Their behaviour is given by probabilistic Markov models
where the probabilities are extracted from the real data set.
3) Details: The simulation starts with a number of sales
clerks that serve the customers, an initial number of customers
and one manager that does the scheduling.
The in-degree distribution is used as an indication of how
good a sales clerk can be. Each sales clerk is assigned an in-
degree value in each step of the simulation when the sales
clerk searches for customers in need of assistance. The bigger
their in-degree the more customers they can help.
RetSim has different inputs needed in order to run a simula-
tion. The input data concerns the distributions of probabilities
for scheduling the sales clerks, the items that can be purchased
and different statistic measures for the customers. A CSV file
which contains an identifier, description, price, quantity sold
and total sales specify these inputs. For setting the parameters,
including the name of the CSV-file, we use a parameter file
that is loaded as the simulation starts or the can also be set
manually in the GUI.
Figure 1 shows the different use cases of the agents. This
model represent the different actions that an agent can take
inside the system.
Salesman
Customer
Manager
Start Working Stop Working Enter Store
Find Item
Find HelpHelp customer
Check Inventory
Manage PricesOrder Items
Register Sale
Buy
Return Item
Schedule next Step
Fig. 1. RetSim Use Case Diagram
Manager scheduler: This agent is in charge of
scheduling the next step of the simulation. There is
only one manager per store. This agent creates the
new customers that are going to arrive to the store
according to a distribution function extracted from
the original data set. The manager also allocate the
sales clerks that are going to be active during the this
step of the simulation.
Customer finder: Is performed by the sales clerk
and it starts with the agent searching nearby for a
customer that is not being helped by an other sales
clerk. Once the contact is established a sale is likely
to occur with a certain probability.
Sales clerk finder: Customers that are still in need
for help can also look for nearby sales clerks. This
again could lead to a sale.
Network generation: Every time a transaction is
performed between a customer and a sales clerk,
an edge is created in the network composed of the
customers and the sales clerks in attendance. The
weight of the edge represent the sales price. The
network grows by the inclusion of new customers
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or sales clerks.
Item selection for purchasing: Items are classified
into 5 different categories according to their quantity
or units sold. From the original data we extracted the
probabilities of each of the categories and quantities.
A customer can also purchase more than one item.
Item return after purchasing: A customer can also
decide to return a purchased item with a certain
probability p.
Log of receipt transactions: Each time an item is
purchased a receipt is created. A receipt contains the
information about the customer, sales clerk, item(s),
quantities, sales price, date and discount if any.
B. Validation and Verification
We start the evaluation of our model with the verification
and validation of the simulator and the generated data [17].
Verification ensures that the simulation corresponds to the
described model presented by the chosen scenarios. In our
model, we have included several characteristics from a real
store, and successfully generated a distribution of sales that
involved the interaction of salesmen and customers.
The validation of the model answers the question: Is the
model a realistic model of the real problem we are addressing?
After the calibration of the model using the original data set,
we can see that the descriptive statistics of both top simulations
are close to the descriptive statistics of the real data. For the
purpose of this presentation we performed visual, statistical
tests and evaluated the network topology and parameters to
verify that our simulation is sufficiently similar in behaviour
to the original data to perform fraud detection testing.
Figure 2 shows an overlap of our sample store with different
simulation runs by RetSim. Visually the distributions look
similar. However there are several differences in the small
shapes.
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Fig. 2. Comparison of distribution of simulated vs real data
In figure 3 we can see a box plot comparison of store
one with the RetSim runs. We can visually identify that the
five statistical measures provided by the box plot are similar
without being identical.
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BoxPlot: RetSim vs Store 1
Fig. 3. Box plot of simulated vs real data
Since we are running a simulation, we argue that the
differences are not significant for our purpose, which is to use
this distribution to simulate the normal behaviour of a store,
and later combine this with injected anomalies and known
patterns of fraud.
C. Fraud Scenarios in a Retail Store
In this section we describe how three examples of retail
fraud can be implemented in RetSim. These fraud scenarios
are based on selected cases from the Grant Thornton re-
port [19]. As can be seen in section V-A, the different scenarios
can be implemented in almost the same way. Furthermore,
a fraudulent sales clerk will probably use several different
methods of fraud, which means that RetSim needs to be able
to model combinations of all fraud scenarios implemented.
Although the implementation of these scenarios are out of the
scope of this paper, we include a description and explain how
to implement them in RetSim.
1) Refunds: This scenario includes cases where the sales
clerks creates fraudulent refund slips, keeping the cash refund
for themselves. In terms of the object model used in RetSim,
the refund scenario can be implemented by the following
setting: Estimate the average number of refunds per sale and
the corresponding standard deviation. Use these statistics for
simulating refunds in the RetSim model. Fraudulent sales
clerks will perform normal refunds, as well as fraudulent once.
The volume of fraudulent refunds can be modelled using a
sales clerk specific parameter. The “red flag” for detection
will in this case be a high number of refunds for a sales clerk.
To model the first scenario we need information about the
relevant parameters describing the normal behaviour: figure 4
shows the percentage of total value of refunds divided by the
total sales for each salesman, for the simulation rs5125. The
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figure shows the values for both the normal behaviour, and
two simulations with injected return fraud. The first fraud
simulation (-+-) shows a conservative fraud behaviour agent
where the agent will not attempt to commit fraud if the sales
value is more than 800 units in the fictitious currency, and the
frequency with which it commits this fraud is 5% of all sales.
The total profit obtained by all fraudulent agents in a year is
161630 units in this scenario.
The second fraud simulation (-.-) shows an aggressive fraud
agent behaviour where the threshold to commit fraud is 600
units and the frequency is 10% of sales. The total profit
obtained by all agents is 400451 units per year.
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Fig. 4. Return Value Over Sales Total per Salesman
2) Coupon reductions/discounts: This scenario includes
cases where the sales clerk registers a discount on the sale
without telling the customer, i.e., the customer pays the full
sales price, and the sales clerk pockets the difference. In
terms of the object model used in RetSim the coupon reduc-
tion/discounts scenario can be implemented by the following
setting: Estimate the average number of cancellations per sale
and the corresponding standard deviation. Use these statistics
for simulating discounts in the RetSim model. Sales clerks
who perform fraud will make normal discounts, as well as
fraudulent ones. The volume of fraudulent discounts can be
modelled using a sales clerk specific parameter. The “red flag”
for detection will in this case be a high number of discounts
for a sales clerk with a low number of average sales.
Figure 5 shows the percentage of the total value of dis-
counts over the total sales before discount for each salesman
for the simulation rs5125. The figure shows the values for
both normal behaviour together with two simulations with
injected discount fraud. The first fraud simulation (-+-) shows
a conservative fraud agent behaviour where the threshold to
commit fraud is 800 units and the frequency is 5% of sales.
The total profit per year, for by all agents is 18423 units.
The second fraud simulation (-.-) shows an aggressive agent
with a fraud threshold of 600 units and the frequency 10% of
the sales. The total profit obtained by all agents is 80600 units
per year.
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D. Results
We extracted statistical information that comprises the sales
from one store during one year. The store one sample contains
147037 records of transactions. The retailer runs a fidelity
program that allows customers to register their purchases. This
means that the majority of receipts belong to unidentified
customers. However for all these records we can identify the
item(s), sales price and the salesman.
Fraud analysis has traditionally been strongly associated
with network analysis. This is because of the possibility
of several actors participating in a specific fraud in order
to confuse the investigators and dilute the evidence, hence
describing a network of actors, companies, ownership etc.
By doing this we aim to model the micro behaviour of the
different agents that captures the observed macro behaviour
and gives rise to a total picture of the store. We use the
properties of the original social network generated from the
customers and simulated a similar network with the aim of
keeping the social network properties or the original such as
topology, average in-degree and out-degree distribution of the
salesmen and customers.
From the network analysis there is a lot of data we can
use for our model. One of data point is that the 90.26% of the
members have been helped by only one salesman, as described
by the out-degree distribution.
We have no known instances of fraud in the real data (as
certified by the data owner). So we will have to inject mali-
cious behaviour, by programming agents that behave according
to some known or hypothesised retail fraud case presented
before: Refunds and Discounts.
In terms of the object model used in RetSim the refund sce-
nario can be implemented by the following setting: Estimate
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the average number of refunds per sale and the corresponding
standard deviation. Use these statistics for simulating refunds
in the RetSim model. Fraudulent salesmen will perform normal
refunds, as well as fraudulent once. The volume of fraudulent
refunds can be modelled using a salesman specific parameter.
The “red flag” for detection will in this case be a high number
of refunds for a salesman.
Similar to refund scenario, RetSim generates malicious
coupon reduction/discounts and the analysis can also be per-
formed in similar way as with refund fraud.
VI. BANKSIM, A BANK TRANSACTIONS SIMULATOR
Initial studies started on BankSim with the purpose of cre-
ating a MABS that can be used for studying fraud prevention
pertaining to online financial services. The motivation for this
is that authorities like the Federal Financial Institutions Exam-
ination Council (FFIEC) in the US and the European Central
Bank (ECB) in Europe have stepped up their expected min-
imum security requirements for financial institutions[20][21],
including requirements for risk management of online banking.
Thus, access to proper risk management tools is becoming
increasingly important, including tools for simulating and
being prepared for emerging threats. However we had no
access to this type of financial data until we participated in a
contest presented by the BBVA bank in Spain. his contest had
the aim of promoting the development of applications for the
so called “big data challenge” using their aggregated financial
information provided by a web service.
A. Data Analysis
The data exposed to the public in the Bank web service con-
tained information on credit card payments during 6 months
(November 2012 until April 2013) for the cities of Madrid and
Barcelona.
The data was segregated by zip code, gender, and age, and
was aggregated by week and month. The web service imple-
mented by the bank provided rich statistical information useful
to build an agent model that contains all the consumption
patters specified in the data.
The payments were categorised in 14 different categories
that allowed the differentiation between e.g. transactions made
at a restaurant or in a car dealership. We could also identify
consumptions patterns by gender and age, that allowed us to
build different kind of agents and implement their consumption
pattern according to their given initial characteristics.
A social network is also possible to implement due to the
possibility to see the zip code origin of the card used for
the payment. Therefore we could identify and build a social
network of different agents making payments in different
zones of origin.
B. Model
The preliminary design of BankSim was again based on the
ODD model introduced by [18].
We aim to produce a simulation that resembles real bank
transactions between customers and merchants. Our main pur-
pose is to generate a synthetic data set of payment transactions
that can be used for the development and testing of different
fraud detection techniques. Our model so far only covers bank
payments and withdrawals, but we aim to extend it to bank
deposits as soon as we can get access to statistical information
or real data to properly validate the outcome.
There are two agents in this simulation are: Merchants and
Customers.
Merchant Is in charge of selling one of the cate-
gories of available products to the customers.
Customer The behaviour is determined by the goal
of purchasing one or several items from the different
categories. A customer searches for merchants in its
surroundings and execute payments after obtaining
the goods.
1) Process overview and scheduling: During a normal step
of the simulation a customer can select a category to start
a purchase. After selecting the desired category, it enters
the simulation environment and sense any nearby merchants
that matches the selected category. There are two different
outcomes: Either a transaction takes place, with probability p,
or no transaction takes place (with probability 1− p).
The web service provides detailed information about the
time granularity of the transactions. This allows the simulator
to set its time granularity between hours or days. So a normal
week can either have seven steps or 24×7, if hour granularity
is chosen. We do not make any explicit distinction between
specific days of the week, information about each day of the
week is provided by the web service of the bank.
2) Design Concepts: The basic principle of this model is
the concept of a commercial transactions. We can observe
an emergent social network from the relation between the
customers and merchants of the same or different zip codes.
Each of the customers have the objective of purchasing articles
or services from the merchants. In our virtual environment the
interaction between agents is always between merchants and
customer. However we aim to extend the model later to allow
customer/customer interaction (transfers).
The agents do not perform any specific learning activities.
Their behaviour is given by probabilistic Markov models
where the probabilities are extracted from the provided data
set and specified per hour or day.
C. Evaluation and Results
Similar to the RetSim case, we start the evaluation of
our model with the verification and validation of simulator
and the generated data [17]. Verification ensures that the
simulation corresponds to the described model presented by
the chosen scenarios. In our model, we have included several
characteristics from a real scenario where the interaction
between merchants and customers is given by the commercial
transaction. We successfully generated a data set of payments
that involved the interaction of our agents under our virtual
environment.
The validation of the model answers the question: Is the
model a realistic model of the real problem we are addressing?
We calibrate the model using the original data set values.
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But since BankSim is currently in a development phase, the
evaluation and results of this simulator are not yet available.
Similar to what we previously did with RetSim, we aim to
perform visual, statistical tests and evaluated the network
topology and parameters to deduce whether our simulation
is sufficiently similar to perform fraud detection testing.
VII. DISCUSSION
We started with a rather trivial but meaningful simulation
of a payment system (PaySim). The original goal of finding
money laundering in financial transaction is an ambitious goal
which lead us to the building of two more simulators RetSim
and BankSim.
RetSim was our first attempt to simulate commercial trans-
actions based on real data. The benefit of a deep data anal-
ysis allowed the simulator to accurately generate synthetic
transactional logs of the store. Our evaluation showed that
we obtained a data set that resembled the original data set.
This without disclosing personal and private information of
the customers. We succeed on using this simulator to seek
answers about simple threshold detection and its effectiveness.
In a real data set the cost of the fraud is most of the time
unknown, and it is estimated by using a control mechanism
such as inventory control and video surveillance of the store.
This does not represent a problem for RetSim since we flag
each transaction with the type of fraud committed.
RetSim has many improvements over PaySim. First, it uses
the benefit of real data to calibrate and evaluate the model,
second it uses the ODD methodology to describe and model
the whole process and specify the agents. It finally uses
its output to analyse a realistic fraud scenario and answer
questions regarding fraud detection methods.
One piece was missing in the financial chain, and it was
a bank simulator. We started to develop BankSim. BankSim
is still in early development but we hope to follow the path
of RetSim and prove its usefulness on developing and testing
fraud detection methods.
All simulators share common log formats for compatibility
with other software used to analyse the transactional logs.
This is an important characteristic in this framework that will
enable us in a future to make available standard data sets to
the research community and the public in general.
Every time we build a simulator for financial transactions
we aim to make it compatible with the previous simulators
and also to avoid previous pitfalls in the design, model and
implementation. PaySim for instance, required real data to
calibrate the model. RetSim uses less detailed aggregated
information as we are currently using on BankSim.
Modelling social financial behaviour of customers have its
challenges. This paper present the way we addressed the
problem of social simulation for financial transactions. One
approach we considered was to implement social economical
patterns of consumptions to build up an agent with preferences
and choices. However, our goal here is to replace a data set
that currently represent an detailed instance of a real world
social situation. Using an statistical approach was a straight
forward direction for simulation the “normal” behaviour of
agents. However, the behavioural patterns known by fraudsters
and criminals, allow the implementation a different model
that makes the fraudster an agent that aims to maximise
its profit and uses specifics patterns of action that aims to
disguise the crime. This social behaviour was implemented
in our simulators using known criminal behavioural patterns
parameterised to fit different fraud scenarios.
We injected the most common known fraud behaviours,
but we are aware that there are many other fraud behaviours
that can have a significant economical impact on the criminal
activities. We have only touched the surface of what is possible
with the scenarios we have implemented.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper addressed the problem of a lack of public avail-
able data sets for fraud detection research. We experienced
this difficulty and discovered that many other researchers in
this field share this experience. The three simulators presented
in this paper allow researchers to generate synthetic data sets
that are useful for experiments in fraud detection.
In summary, we presented three case studies that implement
a Multi-Agent Based Simulation model to address the problem
of social simulation of financial transactions for fraud detec-
tion research. Our agent model with its programmed micro
behaviour, produces a similar type of overall interaction net-
work that we can observe in the original data, and furthermore,
this interaction network give rise to the same macro behaviour
for the whole store as for the real store as well. All three
simulators use the same Multi-Agent Based Simulation toolkit
called MASON[16] which is implemented in Java.
PaySim is our first attempt and a good example of the use
of a synthetic data set representing a simulated scenario in
the mobile money domain. We tested some machine learning
algorithms to try to detect fraud using labelled data. While
doing this we also avoided any possible issue related to privacy
and identity protection of the customers of the service.
We also presented RetSim, and argued that it is ready to
be used as a generator of synthetic data sets of commercial
activity of a retail store. Data sets generated by RetSim can
be used to implement fraud detection scenarios and malicious
behaviour scenarios such as a salesmen returning stolen shoes
or abusing discounts. We used the RetSim simulator to inves-
tigate these two fraud scenarios. Our simulator give us the
benefit over real data that we can quantify and measure the
amount of loses committed by our malicious agents.
We used the RetSim simulator to investigate two fraud
scenarios to see if threshold based detection could keep the
risk of fraud at a predetermined set level. While our results
are preliminary, they seem to indicate that this is so. This is
interesting in that it could act to explain why we have not
observed more use of more advanced methods in industry
even though research into more advanced techniques has
been common for quite some time now. Another consequence
could well be that given that simple threshold based detection
is sufficient there is little economic room for other more
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advanced fraud detection methods that are more costly to
implement.
We are currently in a preliminary phase of development
with regards to BankSim. Our work with this simulator is
just beginning with the hope to present interesting results
in a future paper. We aim to rebuild our payment simulator
based on real data. We have successfully achieved a realistic
simulation for a retail store which we would like to extend to
different kinds of retail stores. And finally we are negotiating
with a Bank in Scandinavia to be able to extend the scope of
BankSim and be able to access real data sets to model and
develop deposits and enrich the BankSim simulator.
One of the biggest challenges for is to integrate all three
simulators into one single Multi-Simulator that shares a com-
mon reference to the customers and can keep track of the
transactions of a single agent across all simulators. Money
Laundering exist somewhere in a complex chain that starts
with placement of illegal funds into the legal financial systems,
then a number of layering operations to hide the true origins
and finally an integration stage that involves formal and legal
economic activities. Our approach will focus on the integration
of these different domain simulators as the key to research in
the area of money laundering.
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